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Institutional fields as linked arenas: Inter-field resource dependence, institutional work  




Theories of institutional change have paid limited attention to the ways in which relations 
between institutional fields might facilitate or hinder institutional change. I introduce inter-
field resource dependence as an important condition explaining institutional change between 
fields. Building on resource dependence theory, I conceptualize two dimensions of inter-field 
resource dependence: mutual dependence and power imbalance. I argue that these two 
dimensions have opposite effects on the likelihood of institutional change between fields. 
Mutual dependence between two fields increases the chances of institutional change by 
inducing actors in both the fields to work at creating new shared institutions in order to regulate 
their mutual dependence. Power imbalance between two fields decreases the chances of 
institutional change by inducing actors in the dominant field to work at maintaining existing 
institutions in order to preserve their power. Developing this core argument, I theorize that 
whether the institutional change occurring between two fields is radical or incremental is a 
function of the type of resource dependence linking the two fields; for example, when power 
imbalance is high, institutional change is unlikely but when it occurs it tends to be radical. 
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 Technology transfer offices on US campuses numbered only in the 20s in 1980, but 
exceeded 200 by the year 2000. From 1980 to 2000, the number of patents assigned to 
research universities rose 850% (Colyvas and Powell, 2006: 307). When the legitimacy 
of technology licensing was low, the boundaries between university and industry were 
sharp and coherent (Colyvas and Powell, 2006: 326)…the development of technology 
licensing at U.S. universities is a reflection of a process of institutional change whereby 
the realms of public and private science have become integrated into a common domain 
(Colyvas and Powell, 2006: 312).  
 
Today, technology licensing is an “institution” – i.e. a legitimate and taken-for-granted 
practice (Maguire & Hardy, 2009: 150) - that regulates the exchange of resources (such as 
money and knowledge) between the institutional fields of academic and commercial science. 
Viewed historically, as in the quotes above, technology licensing is a case of “institutional 
change”, defined here as “the creation of a new institution or the significant modification of an 
existing institution” (cf. Greenwood & Suddaby, 2009: 176). More specifically, it is only one 
case of an increasingly common phenomenon: institutional change occurring at the intersection 
of multiple institutional fields. As the specialized sectors composing contemporary global 
society become more interdependent, institutional change more often occurs where fields 
intersect, raising the fundamental practical problem of understanding how institutions form and 
change at these multi-sector intersections.  
Several examples illustrate this phenomenon: the creation of the multidisciplinary 
partnership’s practices between the fields of accounting and consultancy (Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2006); the transposition of aesthetic practices from the fashion’s field to mobile 
telephony (Djelic & Ainamo, 2005); the emergence of Bio-tech-dedicated practices between 
the fields of private venture capital and public science (Powell & Sandholtz, 2012). Taken 
 together, these examples show that the “interstitial spaces” between fields (Furnari, 2014: 439) 
provide fertile ground for institutional change because each institutional field is characterized 
by distinctive institutions, which can be combined in novel ways, eventually giving rise to new 
practices and institutions. 
Yet, for almost every instance of successful institutional change at the intersection of 
fields, there is another institutional change that failed to take root. For example, Ozcan and 
Santos (2014) document how prominent actors in the two fields of financial services and 
telecommunications failed to institutionalize common practices to collaborate effectively. This 
and other examples of unsuccessful institutional change (e.g. Kahl, Liegel & Yates, 2012) 
speak to the inherent difficulty of realizing the potential for change embedded in fields’ 
intersections because of the often uneasy co-existence of different institutions (e.g. Powell & 
Owen-Smith, 2008: 603; Rao et al., 2000: 251). These contrasting examples raise a puzzle: 
why does institutional change occur between some fields and not others? To address this 
puzzle, this paper investigates the following research question: under what conditions is 
institutional change more likely to occur between two institutional fields?  
This question has been only partially addressed by extant institutional research, despite the 
great attention devoted in this literature to the problem of institutional change in the last two 
decades (see Battilana et al., 2009 for review). Scholars have proposed several important 
explanations of institutional change, such as the presence of skillful “institutional 
entrepreneurs” able to envision new practices (e.g. Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Maguire et 
al., 2004); or bottom-up processes of institutional emergence (e.g. Lawrence et al., 2002; 
Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007); or the varieties of “institutional work” –i.e. intended as “the 
practices aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions” (Lawrence, Suddaby & 
Leca, 2011: 52)-  engaged by individuals and organizations in their “day-to-day adjustments, 
adaptations and compromises” (Currie et al., 2012: 938; Déjean et al. 2004; Lawrence & 
 Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence, Suddaby & Leca, 2009). However, despite the important insights of 
this research, the vast majority of institutional studies have analyzed instances of institutional 
change within a single institutional field, devoting less systematic attention to the issue of how 
institutional change occurs between multiple institutional fields. 
This scope limitation is due to the fact that previous research has mostly conceptualized 
institutional fields as relatively independent social arenas. As Fligstein and McAdam (2012: 
18) recently argued, “virtually all of the previous work on fields focuses on the internal 
workings of these orders, depicting them as largely self-contained, autonomous worlds” (but 
see Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Evans & Key, 2008; Furnari, 2014 for exceptions). This 
imagery contrasts with the examples opening this article and with the increasing 
interdependence that characterizes fields in the real world. Following Fligstein and McAdam 
(2012)’s call, the point of departure of this paper is that a more complete theory of institutional 
change requires conceiving fields no more as “disconnected islands” but as “linked arenas”: if 
we systematically theorize the relations linking fields, we will be in a better position to explain 
why institutional change is more likely to occur between some fields rather than others.  
This paper takes a step toward this goal by conceptualizing one particular relation between 
fields –the relation of “inter-field resource dependence”- as an important, hitherto under-
studied, condition to explain institutional change between fields. Building on resource 
dependence theory (Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer & Salancick, 1978), I define inter-field resource 
dependence as the extent to which the effective functioning of a focal field hinges on resources 
controlled by actors in another field. I identify two analytically distinct dimensions1 of an inter-
field resource dependence relation: mutual dependence (or the sum of two fields’ dependencies 
on each other’s resources) and power imbalance (or the difference between two fields’ 
dependencies on each other’s resources) (cf. Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005: 168). I argue that 
these two dimensions have opposite effects on the likelihood of institutional change between 
 fields. When the level of mutual dependence between two fields is high, actors in both the fields 
are likely to create new institutions aimed at regulating their mutual dependence. Differently, 
when the level of power imbalance between two fields is high, actors in the more powerful field 
are likely to maintain existing institutions to preserve their favorable resource exchange 
conditions. Thus, I contend that different forms of resource dependence between fields motivate 
actors in the fields to undertake different forms of “institutional work” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 
2006) aimed at either creating new institutions or maintaining existing institutions. In turn, these 
forms of work, if successful, will eventually result in institutional change or persistence, thereby 
shaping the likelihood of institutional change between fields. I further develop these core 
arguments by theorizing the type of institutional change (radical vs incremental) that is more 
likely to emerge under different levels of mutual dependence and power imbalance. Finally, I 
also discuss the combined effect of mutual dependence and power imbalance on the likelihood 
and type of institutional change.  
This paper makes three contributions. First, I contribute to institutional change research by 
providing a theoretical explanation of why institutional change is more likely to occur between 
some fields rather than others. Specifically, this paper advances existing research by theorizing 
that the intersections between fields are not all equal, but rather offer different opportunities for 
institutional change depending on the type of inter-field resource dependence that characterizes 
them. Second, I contribute to institutional work research by theorizing how inter-field resource 
dependence provides opportunities and constraints for actors to undertake institutional work. In 
doing so, I outline a contingent approach to institutional work, taking seriously the influence of 
socio-structural factors on institutional work and responding to the call for more research on 
how macro-level conditions interact with micro-level processes of institutional change 
(Battilana et al, 2009: 85-86). Finally, I contribute to research on institutional fields by 
conceptualizing two dimensions of an inter-field resource dependence relation, thus advancing 
 a relational view of fields as “linked ecologies” (Abbott, 2005) rather than as self-contained 
domains.  
 
Literature review  
The concept of institutional field  
 An institutional field is a social arena in which individuals and organizations partake of 
a common meaning system and interact more frequently with one another than with actors 
outside of the field (Scott, 1994: 206-207). According to this classic definition, fields are 
identified by the presence of meaning systems that are shared by field participants. These shared 
meanings are encoded in a field’s institutions –i.e. the taken-for granted practices constituting 
the “culturally legitimate models of organization and action” in a field (Clemens & Cook, 1999: 
442). From this perspective, “fields only exist to the extent that they are institutionally defined” 
(Di Maggio & Powell, 1983: 148). This institutional conception of fields has important 
implications for defining the boundaries of a field. While research on field boundaries has 
traditionally been scant, “there is growing awareness that field boundaries are constructed 
around common meaning systems” (Suddaby, Cooper & Greenwood, 2007: 335; see also Mohr, 
2005; Scott, 2008; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). In fact, the meaning systems shared in a field 
allow for “collective identification”, marking the distinction of field members from non-
members (Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010: 191).  
 
Theories of institutional change  
 Institutional change has been a central theme in institutional research for the last two 
decades (see Clemens & Cook, 1999; Dacin et al. 2002; Battilana et al. 2009 for reviews). At 
least two major theoretical perspectives on this theme can be distinguished, each emphasizing 
different sources and processes of institutional change.  
  A first perspective highlights exogenous sources of change, such as environmental jolts 
(Meyer, 1982), shifts in societal values (Rao et al. 2003) or regulatory punctuations (Haveman 
et al. 2001). In terms of change processes, this perspective focuses on how exogenous shocks 
activate changes in the broader institutional environment surrounding a field, modifying the 
selection criteria shaping the evolution of institutions within that field (e.g. Haveman & Rao, 
1997; Sine & David, 2003). Typically, these studies de-emphasize the role of human agency in 
institutional change, privileging structural explanations of institutional emergence.  
 A second perspective emphasizes endogenous sources of change, such as the presence 
of “institutional contradictions” (Seo & Creed, 2002) or the positions occupied by actors in a 
field (Leblebici et al., 1991; Maguire et al., 2004; Battilana, 2006). In terms of change 
processes, studies of institutional contradictions highlight that contradictions can shape actors’ 
consciousness, prompting them to change existing institutions (Seo & Creed, 2002; Voronov & 
Yorks, 2015). Scholars of field positions highlight instead how specific positions in a field 
enable the actors occupying them to work towards change, emphasizing in particular the key 
role of peripheral positions (e.g. Leblebici et al., 1991). Differently from the exogenous-change 
perspective, these studies direct attention to how institutional change is shaped by human 
agency, either in the form of “institutional entrepreneurship” (e.g. Maguire et al., 2004) or in 
the form of “institutional work” –i.e. the practices undertaken to create, maintain and disrupt 
institutions (e.g. Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013).  
 Taken together, these two perspectives have greatly contributed to our understanding of 
why and how institutions change. However, by and large, this literature has focused on 
institutional change occurring within one single field, devoting less attention to the problem of 
when and how institutional change happens between multiple fields. A selected group of studies 
have addressed this problem from the perspective of actors that are positioned between fields, 
demonstrating empirically that these actors are more likely to act as institutional entrepreneurs 
 (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006) and initiate institutional change by transposing practices across 
fields (Boxenbaum & Battilana 2005).  
 Although these studies of bridging field positions have paved the way for a better 
understanding of how institutional change can occur between fields, they also feature two 
limitations. First, this research has relied on single case studies, thereby focusing on one 
particular intersection between fields at a time, rather than comparing different fields’ 
intersections and their capacities to generate institutional change. As a result, this research 
provides fewer insights to address the central research question of this paper –i.e. why some 
intersections between fields are more prone to originate institutional change than others. 
Second, by relying on single case studies, this research has devoted less attention to 
systematically compare the different types of institutional changes that can emerge between 
fields and the conditions shaping their emergence (cf. Dacin, Goodstein & Scott, 2002: 50). To 
address these limitations, a more general framework is needed in order to compare –along some 
common conceptual dimensions- different intersections between fields and examine whether 
their differences can explain when institutional change is more likely to occur and what types 
of institutional changes are more likely to occur. 
 One way to build such a comparative framework is to shift the focus from positions to 
relations between fields. In fact, conceptualizing the relations between fields along some 
common analytical dimensions allows one to see how intersections between fields differ along 
those dimensions, thereby facilitating systematic comparison. A few studies have recently 
moved in this direction by focusing attention on the multiple ways in which fields can overlap 
(Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Evans & Key, 2008; Furnari, 2014; cf. Greenwood & Hinings, 
1996). In the following sections, I build on and further advance this emerging inter-field 
perspective by theorizing resource-based relations between fields through the lens of resource 
dependence theory. I first explain why I decided to focus specifically on resource-based 
 relations between fields, moving next to illustrate the value of resource dependence theory to 
conceptualize such inter-field relations.  
 
Institutional fields as linked arenas: The importance of resource-based relations 
between fields  
Institutional fields can be connected via multiple types of relations. For example, Evans 
and Key (2008) argue that fields are “institutionally connected” when actors in one field have 
the capacity to “shape the rules by which another field operates” (p. 974). Relatedly, 
Greenwood and Hinings (1996) discuss the “permeability” of a focal institutional field, 
defining it as the extent to which a field is exposed to ideas from another field (p. 1030). 
Whereas these notions emphasize institutional or ideational relations between fields, in this 
paper I focus on resource-based relations –i.e. relations constituted by regular exchanges of 
resources between fields.  
I focus on resource-based relations between fields because resources2 have been shown 
to be particularly important for explaining institutional change, which is the core phenomenon 
of interest in this article. In fact, several studies have highlighted the key role of resources, and 
particularly resource constraints, in motivating actors to work towards institutional change (e.g. 
Leblebici et al. 1991; Battilana & Leca, 2010; Sherer & Lee, 2002). The key argument of these 
studies is that resource-constrained actors are typically “less caught by institutionalized 
relationships and expectations” (Greenwood et al. 2011: 339), becoming more motivated to 
change the institutions that disadvantage them (Leblebici et al. 1991). However, these studies 
have discussed resource constraints arising from the internal structure of a field, without 
systematically theorizing the resource constraints deriving from the “relationships between 
fields and the complexities they may create” (Smets, Morris & Greenwood, 2011: 6). As I 
 illustrate below, with the concept of inter-field resource dependence I intend to capture this 
latter type of resource constraints.  
It is important to note that a focus on resource-based relations between fields is 
consistent with the definition of field adopted in this paper, according to which fields are 
identified by the presence of common meanings and institutions shared by field participants 
(Scott, 1994: 206-207). In fact, following Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury (2012), in this 
paper I assume that “resources…have partial autonomy from culture and institutions” (p. 157). 
This assumption is justified on the ground that it is useful to keep resources and institutions 
analytically distinct in order to take into account how resources “have economic and socio 
structural effects separate from their institutional effects” (Thornton et al. 2012: 157). From 
this perspective, two fields that are ‘institutionally dis-connected’ (i.e. characterized by 
distinctive shared meanings and institutions) can still be connected resource-wise (i.e. linked 
by resource exchanges). Thus, my focus on resource-based connections between fields is not 
only compatible with the conceptualization of fields as ‘institutionally defined’ social arenas 
adopted in this paper, but also useful to theorize the analytically separable effect of resource-
based relations on institutional change.3  
 
Conceptualizing resource-based relations between fields: A resource dependence 
perspective 
To conceptualize the relations of resource exchange between two fields, I build on 
resource dependence theory (Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer & Salancick 1978; see Wry et al. 2013 
for review) for two key reasons. First, resource dependence theory distinguishes two different 
dimensions of a resource dependence relation (i.e. mutual dependence and power imbalance) 
(Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Gulati & Sytch, 2007), providing a fine-grained conceptual 
apparatus to theorize resource-based relations between fields and allowing to unpack how these 
 dimensions affect, separately and in combination, institutional change. Second, the relational 
notion of dependence central to resource dependence theory allows one to consider each field’s 
dependence on the other field, facilitating the theorization of how these dyadic dependencies 
affects actors in each respective field. In other words, seeing resource dependence as a property 
of the relation between two fields allows to take into account simultaneously the actors in both 
the fields rather than focusing on a single focal field.   
These two features differentiate the approach developed here from the only two studies 
that have explicitly discussed resource-based relations between fields (Fligstein & McAdam, 
2012: 18; Evans & Key, 2008: 974-975). In fact, whereas both these studies point at the 
importance of resource dependencies between fields, they do not explicitly build on resource 
dependence theory for conceptualizing inter-field relations. As a result, they do not leverage 
the analytical potential of this theory to unpack the different dimensions of inter-field resource 
dependence (i.e. mutual dependence and power imbalance) and theorize their separate effects 
on institutional change. In what follows, I draw on resource dependence theory to develop the 
concept of inter-field resource dependence. 
 
The concept of inter-field resource dependence  
Building on Emerson (1962)’s classic conceptualization of resource dependence 
between social groups, I define inter-field resource dependence as the extent to which the 
effective functioning of a focal field hinges on resources controlled by actors in another field. 
This latter field can be referred to as the “constraining” field (cf. Pfeffer & Salancick, 1978). 
From the perspective of a focal field, the level of inter-field resource dependence is a function 
of two factors: 1) the criticality of resources (i.e. how critical the resources provided by the 
constraining field are for the effective functioning of the focal field); 2) the availability of 
alternative fields that can provide the same resources provided by the constraining field (cf. 
 Emerson, 1962). Thus, a focal field A is dependent on a constraining field B in direct proportion 
to A’s need for B’s resources; and in inverse proportion to the number of alternative fields that 
can provide the same resources to A. In other words, a focal field will be highly dependent on 
another field when the resources controlled by actors in this latter field are highly critical for 
the focal field’s effective functioning and when there are few alternative fields that can provide 
the same resources to the focal field.  
Although the concept of inter-field resource dependence draws from resource 
dependence theory, it is important to emphasize one key difference between the more general 
notion of resource dependence developed in that theory and the more specific concept advanced 
here. That is, the construct of inter-field resource dependence captures a particular class of 
dependence relations involving actors that are members of different institutional fields and that 
are therefore, by definition, socialized into different institutions. In contrast, both Pfeffer and 
Salancick (1978)’s and Emerson (1962)’s seminal works did not consider the institutions 
characterizing the actors exchanging resources. Thus, differently from the general notion of 
resource dependence, the construct of inter-field resource dependence emphasizes the 
‘institutional diversity’ of the actors in an inter-field resource dependence relation (i.e. the fact 
that the dependent actors are embedded in different institutions). As I will illustrate below, this 
conceptual difference is consequential to explain why inter-field resource dependence induces 
actors to engage in institutional work (rather than in the conventional dependence-reduction 
tactics highlighted by resource dependence theory).  
I distinguish two theoretical dimensions of a dependence relation between fields: 
mutual dependence and power imbalance (Casciaro & Piskorski 2005; Gulati & Synch, 2007). 
Inter-field mutual dependence is defined as the sum of two fields’ dependencies on each other’s 
resources (cf. Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005: 168; cf. Emerson, 1962). Since mutual dependence 
is defined as the sum of both fields’ dependencies, the salient level of analysis for 
 conceptualizing mutual dependence is the inter-field relation (i.e. the fields-dyad). Therefore, 
whereas the general definition of inter-field resource dependence (provided above) focuses on 
a focal field, the definition of mutual dependence focuses on the dyadic relation between two 
fields. Mutual dependence captures the total amount of dependencies in a dyad, regardless of 
whether those dependencies are distributed in a balanced or unbalanced way among the actors 
in the dyad (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005: 170). A “high” (low) level of mutual dependence 
between two fields indicates that each field’s resources are highly (lowly) critical for the 
effective functioning of the other field and that there are few (many) alternative fields that can 
provide the same resources.  
An example of two fields connected by high mutual dependence are the pharmaceutical 
field and the field of academic biology when new bio-technologies first emerged in the late 70s 
in USA (Powell & Sandholtz, 2012). At that point in time, biology university labs did not have 
all the necessary expertise and resources to commercialize ready-for-the-market drugs while 
large pharmaceutical corporations lacked access to cutting-edge university science (e.g. 
Powell, White, Koput & Owen-Smith, 2005). In addition, in the late 1970s, there were few 
alternative fields that could provide these resources (pharma-related commercialization 
expertise and cutting-edge biological science), which were highly critical for the functioning 
of both the academic biology and the pharmaceutical fields (Powell et al., 2012). An example 
of two fields that are connected by low mutual dependence are the fields of fashion and the 
field of mobile telephony before the mid-90s: as Djelic & Ainamo (2005) illustrate, these two 
fields had been historically largely independent because the resources of each field were not 
critical for the effective functioning of the other field.   
Inter-field power imbalance is defined as the difference between two fields’ 
dependencies on each other’s resources (cf. Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005: 168; cf. Emerson, 
1962). As for mutual dependence, the salient unit of analysis for defining power imbalance is 
 the inter-field dependence relation (i.e. the fields-dyad). However, differently from mutual 
dependence, power imbalance defines the difference between, not the sum of, two fields’ 
dependencies in an inter-field dependence relation. Suppose that a field A is dependent upon 
field B at a level equal to 4, while field B is dependent upon field A at a level equal to 2. In this 
example, the level of mutual dependence between field A and B will be equal to 6 (4 plus 2); 
whereas the level of power imbalance between them will be equal to 2 (4 minus 2). While 
mutual dependence measures the total amount of dependencies between fields, power 
imbalance measures the level of inequality in the relative distribution of dependencies between 
fields, that is, the level of asymmetry in an inter-field resource dependence relation (cf. Gulati 
& Sytch, 2007). When the level of power imbalance is high, one field is less dependent on the 
other field than vice versa. A field A can be less dependent on field B than viceversa for two 
reasons: 1) either because more alternative fields are available to A for obtaining the same 
resources provided by B than viceversa; 2) or because A provides B with more critical 
resources than viceversa. Following Emerson (1962)’s core insight that power “resides in the 
other’s dependency” (p. 32), actors in the less dependent field will have more power to 
constrain the functioning of the dependent field than the other way around. Therefore, 
conceptually, the level of power imbalance between two given fields captures the extent to 
which actors in the two fields differ in their power to constrain each other.  
An example of two fields linked by a high level of power imbalance are the field of 
chemical production and the field of academic genetics in USA in the mid-1980s, when 
chemical firms obtained exclusive patent rights on a key scientific discovery, namely the 
genetically-modified mouse known as the “oncomouse” (Murray, 2010). As Murray (2010) 
illustrates, the oncomouse was a critical resource for the field of academic genetics because 
scientists needed this particular type of mouse to conduct their scientific activities. When 
patents on the oncomouse were exclusively granted to chemical companies, academic 
 geneticists became increasingly dependent on those companies because they could obtain the 
right to use the oncomouse for their experiments only from those companies. In other words, 
because actors in the chemistry field became the only providers of a resource critical for the 
functioning of the academic genetics field, this latter field became more dependent on the 
chemistry field, which, conversely, became more powerful. Thus, the resource dependence 
relation between these two fields was characterized by high power imbalance.  
Previous research has demonstrated -conceptually, empirically, and mathematically- 
that mutual dependence and power imbalance are analytically distinct dimensions of a resource 
dependence relation that can vary independently (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Gulati & Sytch, 
2007). To better illustrate this point, let me go back to the oncomouse example.  
Before patenting the oncomouse, chemical companies were providing funds and 
technological equipment to universities, obtaining in exchange access to their knowledge and 
to the oncomouse, which was originally invented, but not patented, by university scientists. 
The oncomouse was an important resource not only for university scientists, but also for 
chemical companies, which needed it to test proprietary chemical compounds. Thus, before 
that the oncomouse patent was granted to chemical companies, the academic genetics field was 
dependent on the chemical production field for two types of resources (funds and technology); 
whereas chemical companies were dependent on universities for other two types of resources 
(knowledge and oncomouse). In this case, the level of mutual dependence between the two 
fields is captured by the sum of the four resources exchanged between the fields (funds, 
technology, knowledge, oncomouse). To simplify for illustrative purposes, we can say that the 
level of mutual dependence in this case is equal to 4 (assuming that each type of resources 
counts for 1). Following the same logic, the level of power imbalance is instead equal to zero, 
given that both fields are dependent on the each other for 2 types of resources, so that the 
difference between their dependencies is zero (2 minus 2). Thus, the relation between the 
 chemical production field and the academic genetics field can be characterized, before the 
oncomouse patenting, as a low-power-imbalance and high-mutual-dependence relationship: 
each field needed the other for critical resources and in a balanced, equal, way.  
It is interesting to note that after the oncomouse patent was granted to the chemical 
companies the level of power imbalance between the two fields increased while the level of 
mutual dependence remained unchanged. Given the patent, actors in the academics genetics 
field had now to pay the chemical companies for using the oncomouse. Thus, these actors 
became dependent on the chemistry field for three types of resources (funding, technology, 
oncomouse). In contrast, chemical organizations were now dependent on the academic genetics 
field for only one type of resources (knowledge). To keep with the analytical simplification 
introduced above, the level of power imbalance between the two fields is now higher, shifting 
from 0 to 2 (3 minus 1), whereas the level of mutual dependence remained the same, that is, 4 
(3 plus 1). In other words, the sum of dependencies between the two fields (i.e. mutual 
dependence) remained unchanged, indicating that the two fields remained reciprocally 
dependent on each other’s resources. However, the relative distribution of those dependencies 
among the two fields (i.e. power imbalance) became more unequal, indicating that one field is 
now more dependent on the other than the other way around.  
This vignette illustrates that mutual dependence and power imbalance are two 
analytically distinct dimensions of an inter-field resource dependence relation that can vary 
independently. Thus, for any given level of power imbalance, an inter-field dependence 
relation can be characterized by different levels of mutual dependence and viceversa (cf. 
Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005: 170-171). Assuming that these levels can be only two (low vs 
high), Figure 1 below describes four possible configurations of mutual dependence and power 
imbalance between two institutional fields. 
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Insert Figure 1 about here 
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The quadrants in Figure 1 should not be interpreted as irreversible and static 
configurations. Rather, each quadrant defines the resource dependence relation between two 
fields at a given point in time. This does not imply that the resource dependence relations 
between fields do not evolve over time (due to, for example, changes in technology or 
regulation). Rather, they are intended here as socio-structural relations that, although being 
historically contingent, can be analyzed at discrete points in time due to their relative durability 
of “a distinctively social sort” (Hughes, 1936: 180).  
As discussed above, the two fields of academic genetics and chemical production in the 
mid-1980s (after the oncomouse patenting) described by Murray (2010) constitute a good 
example of fields connected by high power imbalance and high mutual dependence (Quadrant 
2). Basically, these two fields have significant mutual resource dependencies, but one of the 
two fields is more powerful than, yet still to some extent dependent on, the other field. 
Differently, Quadrant 4 describes a situation in which there are limited overall dependencies 
between the fields, but one field is more dependent on the other than viceversa (i.e. high power 
imbalance). An example of this configuration is given by the field of health care services and 
the field of public policy in USA during the Medicare/Medicaid era (Scott et al. 2000): while 
hospitals in the health care services field were dependent on the financial resources provided 
by the government, the government was not dependent on hospitals. As a result, Quadrant 4 
describes a situation in which actors in the more dependent field are more constrained and have 
less leverage than in the scenario described by Quadrant 2, while actors in the less dependent 
field have more unconstrained power and autonomy over the dependent field. Finally, Quadrant 
1 and Quadrant 3 can be described by the examples used above to illustrate the cases of “high 
mutual dependence” and “low mutual dependence”, which are, respectively: the fields of 
 academic biology and the pharmaceutical field in the early bio-tech years (Powell & Sandholtz, 
2012); and the fields of fashion and the field of mobile telephony (Djelic & Ainamo, 2005). In 
fact, in both these cases the institutional fields investigated were linked not only by high mutual 
dependence but also by low power imbalance (because none of the two fields was more 
resource-constrained than the other).  
 
Inter-field resource dependence, institutional work and institutional change 
 In this section, I theorize how the levels of mutual dependence and power imbalance 
between two fields influence the likelihood of institutional change between those fields. 
Towards this goal, I develop three basic arguments. First, I argue that different levels of mutual 
dependence and power imbalance between two fields induce actors in those fields to undertake 
different forms of institutional work (aimed at either creating or maintaining or disrupting 
institutions). In doing so, I use the established three-fold classification of forms of institutional 
work (i.e. creating, maintaining, disrupting institutions) developed by Lawrence and Suddaby 
(2006).4 Second, I argue that these forms of institutional work are more likely to result in 
institutional change as a function of the levels of mutual dependence and power imbalance 
between the two fields. Third, I argue that the institutional changes eventually resulting from 
different forms of institutional work are likely to be of a different kind.  
To develop this last argument, I introduce a distinction between two types of 
institutional changes between fields: radical institutional changes between fields (i.e. changes 
entailing a significant re-distribution of power between the fields) and incremental institutional 
changes between fields (i.e. changes entailing a limited re-distribution of power between 
fields). Building on research distinguishing types of institutional changes (e.g., Dacin et al. 
2002; Colomy, 1998), I develop this distinction to address one of the gaps identified in the 
 literature review above -i.e. the lack of a systematic conceptualization of the types of 
institutional changes that can occur between fields. 
I illustrate these three arguments in the following three sections. Given that, for the reasons 
discussed above, mutual dependence and power imbalance are analytically distinct dimensions, 
I first theorize the separate effect of each of these dimensions, moving next to their combined 
effect. When I discuss the separate effect of each dimension, I assume that the other dimension 
remains constant in an inter-field dependence relation.  
 
The effect of mutual dependence on institutional work and institutional change   
A high level of mutual dependence between two fields indicates that each field’s 
resources are highly critical for the functioning of the other field and that there are few 
alternative fields that can provide the same resources. Given the criticality of resources and the 
scarcity of alternative resource providers, actors in two fields linked by high mutual 
dependence would face significant uncertainty and worst exchange conditions if they do not 
exchange resources with each other (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005: 174; cf. Emerson, 1962). 
Therefore, actors in both the fields are strongly motivated to exchange with each other and to 
make their exchanges work well. However, the different institutions to which these actors have 
been socialized in their respective fields are likely to hinder resource exchanges between fields, 
plaguing them with potential misunderstandings and conflicts (Rao et al. 2000; Phillips et al., 
2000). Under these conditions, actors in both the mutually dependent fields are likely to 
become motivated to create new shared institutions that can smooth the resource exchange 
process by making their exchanges less uncertain and problematic.  
For example, O’Mahoney and Bechky (2008) illustrate how actors from the originally 
separated fields of open-source and commercial software institutionalized “boundary 
organizations” and new shared governance practices for managing their mutual resource 
 dependence (created by the joint production of new software products). These new 
organizational forms and practices became shared institutions between the two fields, enabling 
the diverse actors in the respective fields “to substantively collaborate by building a bridge 
between divergent worlds that allowed collaborators to preserve their competing interests” 
(O’Mahoney & Bechky, 2008: 426; cf. Gray, 1985; Brown, 1991).  
When two fields are linked by low mutual dependence, the resources exchanged are 
instead less critical for the functioning of each other field and there are more alternative fields 
that can provide the same resources. Under these conditions, if actors in the two fields do not 
exchange resources with each other, they would still be able to procure the same resources 
from other fields “on only slightly worst terms” (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005: 173). Thus, in 
this case actors in both fields are likely to care less about their resource exchanges and tolerate 
more the potential misunderstandings, conflicts and uncertainty that, due institutional diversity, 
are likely to characterize those exchanges. As a result, these actors are less likely to devote 
effort to create new institutions for facilitating their inter-field resource exchanges. On the basis 
of these arguments, I submit the following proposition:  
 
Proposition 1: When the level of mutual dependence between two fields is high, actors 
in both the fields are likely to work at creating new shared institutions between the two 
fields. 
 
The institutional work efforts undertaken by actors in mutually dependent fields can 
find “entrenched forms of resistance” due to the institutional diversity characterizing the actors 
involved in inter-field resource exchanges (cf. Rao et al., 2000: 251). However, since actors in 
both fields are likely to work at creating new institutions, it is plausible to hypothesize that this 
joint work is likely to result in institutional change. In fact, previous research has shown that 
 when institutionally diverse actors engage in “co-creation” institutional work, new institutions 
are likely to emerge from their joint efforts (e.g. Zietsma & Mcknight, 2009). Relatedly, 
extensive research on cross-field collaboration demonstrated that when the diverse parties in a 
collaboration relationship are both motivated to make the collaboration work, new practices 
and institutions are more likely to emerge (e.g. Dorado, 2005; Phillips et al., 2000). Building 
on these insights, I hypothesize that the creating work undertaken by actors in mutually 
dependent fields is likely to result in institutional change.  
I argue that the institutional changes occurring between two fields connected by high 
mutual dependence, when they occur, are likely to involve the partial or full hybridization of 
the different institutions characterizing the two fields. With the term “hybridization” I intend 
to capture the creation of new institutions by combining elements of already existing 
institutions. Hybridization can be partial, when elements of existing institutions “are put 
together in new but recognizable ways” (Powell & Sandholtz, 2012: 94). The example of the 
boundary organizations between the fields of open-source and commercial software 
(O’Mahoney & Bechky, 2008) is a good illustration of partial hybridization: the new practices 
created in that case allowed the diverse actors in the two fields “not to collapse or merge [their] 
divergent worlds but to preserve each world’s integrity while building a bridge between them” 
(O’Mahoney & Bechky, 2008: 450). Thus, in partial hybridization the different pre-existing 
institutions combined into a new institution are still recognizable.  
Differently, in full hybridization, pre-existing institutions are fused together into a 
wholesale new institution so that they are no more recognizable. An example of full 
hybridization is the creation of the dedicated-bio-tech firm (DBF)’s practices between the fields 
of academic biology and pharmaceutical production (Powell & Sandholtz, 2012). Actors in 
these fields not only combined the institutionalized practices of one field with those of another, 
but also re-purposed those practices while combining them, so that they were fully transformed 
 in the process of their combination and became therefore un-distinguishable in the new hybrid 
institutions emerging from this process (i.e. the dedicated-bio-tech firm’s practices). 
Metaphorically, partial hybridization can be equated to re-combining Lego pieces of different 
colours to create a new form: although the form is new, by looking at it we can still recognize 
the Lego pieces on the basis of their distinctive colours. In contrast, full hybridization 
resembles the process of mingling different food ingredients into a new sauce, so that the basic 
ingredients are difficult to separate out and distinguish from each other by tasting the final 
sauce. On the basis of these arguments, I submit the following proposition:  
 
Proposition 2: When the level of mutual dependence between two fields is high, 
institutional change is likely to occur, and when it occurs, it is likely to involve the 
partial or full hybridization of the different institutions characterizing the two fields.  
 
Finally, I argue that the institutional changes occurring between two fields connected 
by high mutual dependence, when they occur, are likely to involve a limited re-distribution of 
power between the fields –i.e. to be “incremental”, according to the definition provided above. 
In conditions of high mutual dependence, actors in both fields need each other for accessing 
critical resources that are otherwise difficult to procure. For this reason, actors in each field can 
make a credible threat to stop exchanging resources with actors in the other field, thereby 
exposing these latter actors to the risk of worst exchange conditions and more uncertainty (cf. 
Pfeffer & Salancick, 1978). Under these conditions, it will be difficult for actors in each field 
to obtain more power over the actors in the other field because each attempt to obtain more 
power can be easily countered by the credible treats of leaving the exchange. As a result, actors 
in both fields are unlikely to try significantly changing the power distribution between the fields 
or, if they attempt, they are unlikely to succeed in doing so. For example, Van Wijk and 
 colleagues (2013)’s study of the cross-field collaborations between the fields of corporate 
sustainability and commercial tourism illustrate how such collaborations led to institutional 
changes that were “less radical than initially envisioned” (p. 259), preserving the distribution 
of power between the two fields. On the basis of these arguments, I submit the following 
proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: When the level of mutual dependence between two fields is high, 
institutional change is likely to occur, and when it occurs, it is likely to be incremental, 
involving a limited re-distribution of power between the two fields.   
 
The emergence of technology licensing as a new shared institution between the fields 
of public and private life sciences (Colyvas, 2007) provides a vignette to illustrate the 
institutional change dynamic described by these three propositions. In the late 1970s, these two 
fields were connected by strong reciprocal resource dependencies (Owen-Smith and Powell, 
2008: 606), but they also featured significantly different, and potentially conflicting, 
institutions because “the [institutional] features that buttressed industry also threatened to erode 
the academy” (Colyvas, 2007: 458 [added]). Public science was characterized by peer-review 
and academic publication as its distinctive institutionalized practices (Colyvas, 2007: 458). 
Differently, private science was shaped by the institutions of proprietary knowledge and profit, 
sustained by the practice of patenting (Murray, 2010). Thus, when bio-medical firms and 
universities attempted to exchange their resources (knowledge and money) via collaborations, 
conflict over interpretations of behaviour and responsibilities often arose in those 
collaborations (Colyvas and Powell, 2006). To smooth their institutional differences and 
effectively manage their reciprocal resource dependencies, actors in both the fields worked at 
creating new shared institutions –such as technology licensing- that could facilitate their 
 resource exchanges and joint collaborations. These new shared institutions were made of 
elements drawn from the different institutions historically characterizing the two fields, 
hybridizing those elements into new practices. For example, Colyvas (2007) documents how 
technology licensing’s practices combined different definitions of “what aspect of a scientific 
finding constituted an invention, who was an inventor, and how licensing should be used” (p. 
457). These definitions reflected both the institutions of public access and property rights’ 
protection, which respectively characterized the fields of public and private life sciences. In 
addition, the definitions that were “selectively retained” into the new institutions reflected a 
balance between the pre-existing institutions of the two fields, speaking to the fact that this 
institutional change did not imply a significant re-distribution of power between the fields 
(Colyvas, 2007: 472-474).  
 
The effect of power imbalance on institutional work and institutional change  
A high level of power imbalance between two fields indicates that there is asymmetry 
in the extent to which one of the fields depends on the other field’s resources. According to the 
definition of power imbalance provided above, a focal field can be said to be more powerful 
than another because it has access to more alternative fields as compared to the other field; or 
because it provides more critical resources to the other field than viceversa. As a result, if actors 
in two power-imbalanced fields fail to exchange resources, the actors in the less powerful field 
would face greater uncertainty and worst exchange conditions (than those in the dominant field) 
because they have fewer alternative fields able to provide the same resources that are highly 
critical for the functioning of their field. Conversely, the actors in the dominant field “will find 
it easier to dictate the terms of the relationship by threatening to withdraw from the exchange” 
(Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005: 172).  
 Under this scenario, the actors in the dominant field are more likely to be motivated to 
maintain their field’s institutions in order to preserve their resource advantage. In fact, the 
institutions of the dominant field shape how the field’s resources can be accessed and acquired 
by actors outside the field (Lawrence, 2004; Owen-Smith & Powell, 2008: 616), thereby 
underpinning the resource advantage and power of the actors in the dominant field. By 
maintaining their field’s institutions, actors in the dominant field attempt to preserve their 
advantageous conditions of resource appropriation –i.e. the conditions at which outsiders to the 
field can appropriate their field’s resources- thereby reaffirming their power over the other 
field. For example, Zietsma and Lawrence (2010) describe how incumbent actors engaged in 
boundary maintenance work to prevent outsiders for accessing their field’s resources and 
maintain their power over them (p. 201-203; 205-206).  Relatedly, Currie and colleagues 
(Currie et al. 2012) show how dominant actors (i.e. clinical geneticists) maintained their power 
over resources in the face of external threats by less powerful actors (i.e. genetic nurses).  
The actors in the less powerful field face a different situation. These actors are highly 
constrained by the dominant field due to the limited number of alternative fields providing the 
same resources and the high criticality of those resources. As a result, these actors are relatively 
locked-in to exchange resources with the actors in the more powerful field, despite the fact that 
these latter actors are likely to use their higher power in order to obtain more favourable 
exchange conditions. To access the scarce resources available in the dominant field and reduce 
the power imbalance between the two fields, actors in the less powerful field are likely to work 
towards disrupting the dominant field’s institutions. By disrupting the dominant field’s 
institutions, these actors attempt to improve the unfavourable conditions at which they can 
access the dominant field’s resources, with the aim of changing those conditions to their 
advantage. For example, Zietsma and Lawrence (2010)’s study documents how outsiders 
attempted to “disrupt the institutionalized practice of clear-cutting” in the British Columbia’s 
 costal forestry field, using “dramatic language to delegitimize the practice” in public protests 
and overt attacks on the media (pp. 204-205). Similarly, Maguire and Hardy (2009) describe 
how outsiders to the powerful agribusiness field engaged in “disruptive institutional work” by 
categorizing the DDT practices institutionalized in that field as “unethical, un-desirable, or 
inappropriate” (p. 169). On the basis of these arguments, I submit the following propositions:  
 
Proposition 4: When the level of power imbalance between two fields is high, actors in 
the dominant field are likely to work at maintaining their own field’s institutions.  
 
Proposition 5:  When the level of power imbalance between two fields is high, actors 
in the less powerful field are likely to work at disrupting the dominant field’s 
institutions. 
 
The two opposed forms of institutional work (disrupting and maintaining work) likely 
to be engaged in situations of inter-field power imbalance can give rise to a variety of 
institutional outcomes. Thus, the net effect on institutional change is more uncertain than in the 
scenario described above and requires a more nuanced theorization. In fact, not surprisingly, 
extant studies of institutional change in situations of power imbalance within a field feature 
mixed findings. On one side, research at the intersection of social movements and institutional 
theory (see Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008 for review) has shown that initially powerless 
actors in a field can sometimes succeed in disrupting powerful institutions that disadvantage 
them (e.g. Lounsbury et al. 2003; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010; Maguire & Hardy, 2009). On 
the other side, research has shown that powerful actors are usually able to shut down 
challengers’ change attempts by engaging in maintenance work (e.g. Micelotta & Washington, 
2013; Lawrence, 2008; Currie et al., 2012). For example, Micelotta and Washington (2013) 
 show how powerful Italian professional associations effectively counteract attempts at 
disrupting existing institutional arrangements by re-establishing the status-quo. Similarly, 
Currie and colleagues show how powerful actors can successfully maintain existing institutions 
“relatively untouched” in order to re-affirm their power (Currie et al. 2012: 957).  
Taken together, these mixed findings demonstrate that the success of less powerful 
actors in disrupting existing institutions and thus producing institutional change is possible, but 
not probable, due to the presence of more powerful “defenders of the status-quo” whose 
interests are threatened by institutional disruption (Oliver, 1992: 578). Being more powerful, 
these institutional defenders have by definition access to more substantial resources, which can 
be invested in institutional maintenance projects (e.g. Hensmans, 2003; Micelotta & 
Washington, 2013). Building on this rich body of research, I contend that actors in the less 
powerful field can succeed in their institutional disrupting efforts, but their success will not be 
frequent due to the higher power of actors in the dominant field. Therefore, in probabilistic 
terms, institutional change is less likely to occur between fields linked by high levels of power 
imbalance.  
Although less likely, institutional change can occur between power-unbalanced fields 
when actors in the less powerful field do succeed in disrupting the dominant field’s institutions. 
I argue that, when institutional change occurs between two power-unbalanced fields, it is likely 
to be radical, involving a significant re-distribution of power between the fields. Because 
disrupting work explicitly targets the dominant field’s institutions and aims to de-legitimize 
the powerful actors in that field, these latter actors are likely to be stigmatized when disruption 
work succeeds. In turn, the de-legitimation of powerful actors in the dominant field opens up 
opportunities for a significant re-distribution of power between the two fields, prompting the 
entry of new actors (e.g. Scott. et al. 2000; Hardy & Maguire, 2010). In fact, when dominant 
actors are successfully de-legitimated, power is reallocated to new actors that are typically able 
 to display “purity” (Douglas, 1966) by projecting themselves as significantly different from 
the formerly powerful actors. On the basis of these arguments, I submit the following 
proposition: 
 
Proposition 6: when the level of power imbalance between two fields is high, 
institutional change is unlikely to occur, but when it occurs, it is likely to be radical, 
involving a significant re-distribution of power between the two fields.   
 
If institutional change occurs between power-unbalanced fields, it is likely to involve 
the partial or full replacement of the dominant field’s institutions with the institutions of the 
less powerful field. In fact, by directly targeting actors in the dominant field through disruption 
work, actors in the less powerful field create the perception of a salient rival or “enemy”, 
advocating the displacement of the institutions associated with the de-legitimated rival.  This 
argument is consistent with empirical evidence documenting how the perception of a salient 
rival prompts actors to “distance” themselves and mark their difference from the perceived 
rival (e.g. Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Similarly, I argue that successful disruption work on the part 
of the less powerful field’s actors induces those actors to distance themselves from the 
dominant field’s institutions and replace these institutions with their field’s institutions (or 
variants of those institutions). However, successful disruption work does not necessarily imply 
the full replacement of the dominant field’s institutions, although this is a possible outcome 
(see, for example, Rao et al. 2003). Rather, it may involve only the partial replacement of the 
dominant field’s institutions, which may continue to co-exist with the other field’s institutions, 
perhaps in an enduring state of tension (Dunn & Jones 2010; Murray 2010). On the basis of 
these arguments, I submit the following proposition:  
 
 Proposition 7: when the level of power imbalance between two fields is high, 
institutional change is unlikely to occur, but when it occurs, it is likely to involve the 
partial or full replacement of the dominant field’s institutions with the less powerful 
field’s institutions. 
 
  A vignette to illustrate the institutional change dynamics described by these three 
propositions is provided by Rao and colleagues’ study (Rao et al., 2000: 251-259; see also 
Morrill, 2000) describing how the institutionalization of alternative dispute resolution (ADR)’s 
practices occurred at the intersection of two unbalanced fields: the more powerful judicial field, 
populated by judges and “other professional elites (e.g. lawyers and law professors)” (Morrill, 
2000: 36); and the less powerful social services field, populated by social psychologists and 
counsellors. The ADR’s institutional change occurred via the disruption work undertaken by 
actors in the less powerful field (i.e. social workers), who started criticizing the adversarial 
resolution practices conventionally institutionalized in the judicial field. These critiques were 
disruptive in nature, taking the different forms of “broad attacks on institutional underpinnings 
or criticisms of particular practices” (Morrill, 2000: 8). Eventually, the disruption work 
engaged by social workers was successful, attracting a “critical mass of supporters” and 
progressively de-legitimating the powerful actors (i.e. the judges) using the conventional 
practices. In the process, social workers greatly expanded their sphere of influence, acquiring 
new powerful positions by leading the adoption of the new practices, which eventually replaced 
the formerly dominant practices.  
 
The combined effect of mutual dependence and power imbalance on institutional work and 
institutional change  
  A comprehensive theorization of the combined effect of mutual dependence and power 
imbalance on institutional change would require a detailed illustration of all the four 
configurations of these dimensions depicted in Figure 1 above. However, due to space 
constraints, in this section I focus especially on one of these configurations –i.e. the high- 
mutual-dependence/high-power-imbalance’s configuration (Quadrant 2)- because it is the 
more theoretically interesting and the more relevant for the analysis of institutional change 
among the four configurations illustrated in Figure 1.5  
 
Institutional work and institutional change between fields linked by high mutual dependence 
and high power imbalance. In essence, the simultaneous presence of high mutual dependence 
and high power imbalance between two fields indicates: 1) that the two fields are reciprocally 
dependent on each other; 2) that one of the fields is more powerful than, yet still to some extent 
dependent on, the other field. The oncomouse example described above provides an illustration 
of this scenario: in that example, actors in the chemistry field have more power on academic 
geneticists thanks to the oncomouse patent, but they are still partially dependent on academic 
geneticists to access their knowledge.  
In this scenario, the actors in the dominant field are subjected to two competing forces. 
On one side, these actors enjoy favorable exchange conditions and power over the other field’s 
actors, and so they are motivated to maintain the existing institutions underlying their 
dominance. On the other side, although more powerful, they are still dependent on resources 
located in the other field. This reciprocal, yet unbalanced, dependence provides the less 
powerful actors with some leverage to negotiate and obtain more favorable exchange 
conditions by threatening to leave the exchange. For example, after the oncomouse patent, 
genetics universities still exercised some power over chemical companies because they could 
threat to limit industry’s access to the results of their laboratory experiments. This unbalanced 
 mutual dependence exacerbates the problems created by institutional diversity and power 
imbalance (discussed above). In fact, because less powerful actors are likely to be aware of 
their negotiation leverage, they are also likely to make more demands and contest more 
frequently the dominant’s field institutions underlying their disadvantageous resource 
exchange conditions. Thus, the possibility of confrontational behaviors between actors in such 
fields is likely to increase while the possibility to develop mutually satisfactory exchange 
relationships is likely to decrease (cf. Bacharach and Lawler, 1981; Lawler and Yoon, 1996). 
These problems affect the capacity of dominant actors to effectively access and use the 
resources that they need from the other field, despite these actors are in a relatively more 
powerful position as compared to the other field’s actors.  
For these reasons, in this scenario actors in the dominant field are likely to exercise 
their power and work at disrupting the institutions of the less powerful field in order to access 
more directly the resources they need from that field. In fact, by disrupting the institutions of 
the less powerful field, actors in the dominant field can change to their advantage the rules 
defining access to the other field’s resources, thereby creating new conditions for appropriating 
those resources. For example, Thornton (2002) describes the disruption work carried out by 
business corporations to acquire publishing companies, whose practices, rules and beliefs had 
been gradually and systematically dismantled though the “imposition of the corporate mentality 
on a business diametrically opposed to it in the past” (p. 81). Similarly, Rao and Kenney (2008) 
describe how the organizational forms institutionalized in the field of consumer watchdog 
organizations were “hammered into place” by powerful mass media organizations (p. 357; see 
also Rao, 1998).  
In contrast, actors in the less powerful field are likely to maintain their own field’s 
institutions in order to preserve their leverage on the more powerful field. In fact, by being less 
powerful, by definition these actors will have fewer alternative fields that can provide the same 
 critical resources provided by the dominant field. Thus, these actors are likely to be motivated 
to exchange resources with actors in the dominant field and to make efforts to maintain their 
leverage (the dominant field’s dependency on them) in the hope of obtaining more favorable 
exchange conditions. For this reason, these actors are likely to react to the disruptive attacks of 
the dominant field’s actors by undertaking forms of institutional maintaining work aimed at 
preserving their field’s institutions. For example, Marquis and Lounsbury (2007) describe how 
small community banks resisted to the imposition of institutions emphasizing market efficiency 
on the part of large national banks, thereby defending their own institutions centered on 
community and local trust. On the basis of these arguments, I submit the following 
propositions: 
 
Proposition 8: When the levels of mutual dependence and power imbalance between 
two fields are both high, actors in the dominant field are likely to work at disrupting 
the less powerful field’s institutions. 
 
Proposition 9: When the levels of mutual dependence and power imbalance between 
two fields are both high, actors in the less powerful field are likely to work at 
maintaining their own field’s institutions.  
 
The final outcome (in terms of institutional change vs persistence) of these two opposed 
forms of institutional work (disrupting vs maintaining work) is uncertain and ultimately 
depends on which of the two fields’ actors “win”. On one side, previous research demonstrated 
that counter-movements resisting institutional changes imposed by powerful actors can, 
occasionally, be successful (e.g. McAdam, McCarthy & Zald, 1996). On the other side, given 
that actors in the more powerful field have at their disposal more resources to invest in their 
 institutional disrupting efforts, it seems more plausible to argue that these actors are more likely 
to be successful in disrupting the institutions of the less powerful field, as illustrated in 
numerous cases in which dominant actors successfully imposed their institutional change 
projects (e.g. Thornton, 2004; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Rao, 1998; see Lawrence, 2008 for 
review). Thus, I argue that institutional change is likely to occur between fields linked by high 
levels of power imbalance and mutual dependence.  
When institutional changes occur between fields connected by high mutual dependence 
and high power imbalance, these changes are likely to be radical in nature, involving a 
significant re-distribution of power between the fields. For example, Thornton (2004) carefully 
documents how business and financial executives came to dominate the field of publishing, 
thereby leading to a radical change in power distribution. Similarly, Fligstein (1990) shows 
that the institutions associated with manufacturing and marketing functions succumbed to the 
more dominant institutions promoted by powerful actors in the financial services field. 
Although this empirical evidence is at the field level of analysis, rather than at the inter-field 
level, it is plausible to argue that when actors in a dominant field successfully disrupt the 
institutions of a less powerful field, the ensuing institutional change is likely to be radical, 
implying a significant re-distribution of power between the fields.  
 
Proposition 10: When the levels of mutual dependence and power imbalance between 
two fields are both high, institutional change is likely to occur, and when it occurs, it is 
likely to be radical, involving a significant redistribution of power between the two 
fields. 
 
Finally, I argue that, when institutional change occurs between fields linked by high 
mutual dependence and high power imbalance, that institutional change is likely to involve the 
 partial or full replacement of the less powerful field’s institutions with the institutions of the 
dominant field. Thornton (2002) represents an example of full replacement of the institutions 
previously characterizing the publishing field with financial institutions. Differently, Murray 
(2010) is an example of partial replacement. In fact, despite less powerful than chemical firms, 
academic geneticists reacted to these companies’ domination attempts by reshaping the 
meanings of patenting practices imposed by chemical firms. By re-purposing patenting 
practices for academic goals (i.e. by patenting scientific knowledge to keep it public), scientists 
reacted to “commercial encroachment”, transforming the meaning of commercial practices and 
establishing “hybrid practices that preserved their distinctive institutions” (Murray, 2010: 341). 
This example illustrates how partial replacement can conduce to hybrid forms of institutional 
change, allowing the institutions of the two fields to “co-exist” in a state of enduring tension 
(Dunn & Jones, 2010; Reay & Hinings, 2005). On the basis of these arguments, I submit the 
following proposition: 
 
Proposition 11: When the levels of mutual dependence and power imbalance between 
two fields are both high, institutional change is likely to occur, and when it occurs, it is 
likely to involve the partial or full replacement of the less powerful field’s institutions 
with the dominant field’s institutions.  
Discussion 
This paper makes three main contributions to institutional research. First, I contribute 
to extant theories of institutional change by broadening their scope to include instances of 
institutional change between fields and by providing a theoretical explanation of why 
institutional change is more likely to occur between some fields rather than others. So far, 
scholars highlighting the importance of intersections between fields (e.g. Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2006; Boxenbaum & Battilana, 2005; Rao et al. 2000) have relied on case studies of 
 single inter-field intersections, thereby providing fewer insights for comparing different 
intersections between fields and their capabilities to originate institutional change. In this 
paper, I take a step toward filling this gap by identifying inter-field resource dependence as a 
salient inter-field relation, thereby providing a conceptual platform to systematically compare 
different intersections between fields. In addition, I show that different intersections between 
fields offer different opportunities for institutional change depending on the type of resource 
dependence linking the fields under investigation. In doing so, I highlight the value of looking 
at inter-field resource dependence as an important, so far under-studied, source of institutional 
change, moving beyond the prevailing focus of the literature on endogenous sources of change 
within a single field (e.g. Leblebici et al. 1991; Maguire et al. 2004; see also Dacin et al. 2002). 
Whereas this paper’s focus has been on inter-field resource dependence relations, the 
perspective outlined here more generally suggests that it is important to conceptualize the 
linkages between fields and “their very potential to effect change” (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012: 
9). Future research should further theorize how different types of inter-field linkages interact 
in shaping opportunities and constraints for institutional change (cf. Evans & Key, 2008).  
Second, I contribute to theories of institutional work by explaining how different types 
of inter-field resource dependence are likely to induce different forms of institutional work and 
different processes of institutional change. In doing so, I illustrate the mechanisms through 
which inter-field resource dependence motivates actors to undertake institutional work, thereby 
answering the call for more research on unpacking the motivations of actors engaged in 
institutional work (Hwang & Colyvas, 2011). In particular, I focus on actors’ material, 
resource-driven, motivations, which have been relatively under-studied in the institutional 
work literature (Lawrence, Suddaby & Leca, 2009). In fact, while previous research has 
explored how actors become motivated to respond to institutional constraints via various 
resource-based strategies (Oliver, 1991), less systematic attention has been devoted to 
 conceptually explore the reverse –i.e. how resource-based constraints may induce actors to 
work on institutions. In addition, by theorizing how inter-field resource dependence influences 
institutional work, this paper advances our knowledge of how macro-level, socio-structural, 
factors shape micro-level processes of institutional formation; a problem on which more 
systematic research has been repeatedly called for (Battilana et al. 2009: 85-86; Greenwood et 
al., 2011). On one side, studies of institutional work have paid scant attention to how macro-
level conditions influence actors’ work aimed at changing institutions (e.g. see Lawrence et al., 
2013; Lawrence et al., 2011 for review). On the other side, institutional change research has 
acknowledged that macro-level forces shape the micro-processes by which actors can 
successfully change institutions (e.g. Battilana et al., 2009), but has devoted less attention to 
systematically theorize the mechanisms by which these cross-level effects are produced. This 
paper contributes to this broader debate by linking a specific type of macro-level factor –
namely, inter-field resource dependence- to the micro-level processes of institutional work 
unfolding between fields. Future research should further analyze how other types of inter-field 
relations, such as different forms and levels of institutional connection between fields (e.g., 
Evans & Key, 2008; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996) can afford opportunities and constraints for 
various forms of institutional work. 
Third, I contribute to research on institutional fields by conceptualizing fields as linked 
arenas of social action rather than as semi-autonomous domains, as implicitly assumed in most 
previous institutional research (see Scott, 2008: 181-209 for review). In fact, by focusing on 
the resource dependence relations between fields, this paper departs from previous research 
that focused on the internal structure of fields (see Greenwood et al, 2011; Wotten & Hoffman, 
2008 for review). In this regard, this paper addresses the call for better understanding how 
institutional fields are affected “by the myriad ties they share to other fields” (Fligstein & 
McAdam 2012: 19). Building on the original insights of resource dependence theorists (e.g. 
 Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer & Salancick, 1978), this paper answers this call by identifying two 
distinctive dimensions of an inter-field resource dependence relations (mutual dependence and 
power imbalance) and conceptualizing their separate and combined effects on institutional 
change. The conceptualization of these dimensions offers useful insights for future research 
aiming to better understand the overlaps between fields (e.g. Thornton et al., 2005), the genesis 
of those overlaps and their consequences for the emergence of novelty (e.g. Padgett & Powell, 
2012; Furnari, 2014).   
As any other study, this paper has some limitations. A first limitation is that the model 
presented here does not explicitly take into account how different types of institutional work 
may be combined in specific empirical instances of institutional change. For example, Zietsma 
and Lawrence (2010) show how configurations of practice work and boundary work underpin 
cycles of institutional stability and change, emphasizing how these different forms of work are 
recursively inter-related. Differently from this dynamic portrayal, the model presented here 
focuses on the institutional work activities that are likely to be undertaken at a given point in 
time. This perspective has the important benefit of allowing systematic comparisons of 
different intersections between fields and the opportunities they provide for institutional work 
and institutional change. In this regard, this paper provides a useful starting point to further 
investigate how various forms of institutional work can be combined over time during the 
various stages of an institutional change process. For example, future research can address this 
limitation by exploring how changes in inter-field resource dependence might correspond to 
changes in the types of institutional work undertaken by actors in the interdependent fields. 
Another limitation is the simplifying assumption that all actors in a field are equally dependent 
on the resources available in another field, independently on their positions within their field.  
Yet, actors might be differently affected by inter-field resource dependence if they occupy a 
central (e.g. Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006) or peripheral (e.g. Leblebici et al., 1991) position 
 in a field. Following this reasoning, more research is needed to understand whether the 
constraints created by inter-field resource dependence are experienced differently by actors 
occupying central or peripheral positions in their respective fields.  
Despite these limitations, this paper has important implications for practice. For the 
change agents working at the intersection of multiple fields, this paper suggests that some types 
of institutional work (rather than others) may be better suited to achieve institutional change 
depending on the types of resource dependence linking the fields in question. For the policy 
makers interested in promoting (or hindering) institutional change at the intersection of 
multiple fields, this paper provides guidance for identifying the fields that are more likely to 
originate, or to be affected by, institutional change.  
 
Conclusion 
The concept of institutional field has been persistently central in institutional theory 
and organization theory at large. Reinforcing the vital importance of this concept, this paper 
contributes to recent efforts to expand institutional analysis beyond the boundaries of a single 
field by conceptualizing different types of resource dependence relations between fields and 
theorizing their effects on institutional work and institutional change. The increasing 
interdependence of institutional sectors in contemporary global society highlights the urgency 
of such expanded cross-field institutional analyses. This paper takes a step towards this 
direction, providing a conceptual platform to analyse resource-based relations between fields 
and explain the institutional changes possibly emerging from them. Much remains to be 
explored about the constraints and opportunities created by the intersections between 
institutional fields. My hope is that the inter-field perspective outlined here will sensitize 
further research on the various ways in which institutional fields are connected and the 
consequences of such inter-field connections for institutional change and persistence.  
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   My usage of the term “dimensions” is consistent with the terminology traditionally adopted 
in resource dependence theory to refer to mutual dependence and power imbalance (Casciaro 
& Piskorski, 2005; Gulati & Sytch, 2007). This term emphasizes that mutual dependence and 
power imbalance are analytically distinct facets of a power-dependence relationship “because, 
for any value of power imbalance, a power-dependence relation can be characterized by 
varying levels of mutual dependence [and viceversa]” (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005: 170 
[added]). In fact, previous research has demonstrated -conceptually, empirically and 
mathematically- that mutual dependence and power imbalance can vary independently (see 
Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Gulati & Sytch, 2007). I illustrate this point more extensively with 
an example at pages 15-16 of this paper.  
2
   The term “resources” indicates both tangible assets (such as financial capital, supplies and 
physical capital) and intangible assets (such as knowledge and reputation) (Powell, 1991; 
Battilana & Leca, 2010; Pfeffer & Salancick, 1978).  
 
3
  The assumption that resources and institutions are analytically distinct is also consistent with 
the fact that this paper develops a theoretical model that is synchronic in nature, focusing on 
how the level and type of resource dependence connecting two fields at a given point in time 
influence the likelihood of institutional change between the two fields. Differently, a diachronic 
model would have required relaxing this assumption and acknowledging that, from a 
diachronic perspective, resources and institutions can be fruitfully conceptualized as 
reciprocally inter-related (e.g. Sewell, 1992; Giddens, 1984). 
 
4
  I use the institutional work perspective in my theorization because it provides a balanced 
view of the relationship between structure and agency (Currie et al., 2012: 938) by shifting 
attention away from dramatic actions of heroic entrepreneurs (Lawrence et al. 2011: 57; see 
also Delbridge & Edwards, 2008). In addition, it also provides a comprehensive approach to 
 institutional change allowing one to theorize cases of successful as well as unsuccessful 
institutional change (Lawrence et al. 2009).   
 
5
   Quadrant 1’s and 4’s configurations are less theoretically interesting because their 
effects on institutional change can be derived more easily from the propositions illustrated 
above. In quadrant 1, the logic of propositions 1-3 still holds: the positive effect of high mutual 
dependence is reinforced by low power imbalance, which facilitates actors in both fields to 
create institutions, making institutional change more likely to occur. In quadrant 4, the logic of 
propositions 4-7 still holds: the negative effect of power imbalance is reinforced by low mutual 
dependence, which provides actors in the less powerful field with less leverage, making their 
disruption efforts more likely to fail and institutional change less likely to occur. Quadrant 3’s 
configuration is less relevant for understanding institutional change: given a low level of 
mutual dependence and power imbalance, actors in both fields are likely to be less motivated 
to exchange resources and to engage in any type of institutional work to regulate those 
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